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ERISA ENFORCEMENT: MANDATE
FOR A SINGLE AGENCY
Beverly M. Klimkowsky* and Ian D. Lanoff**
Multiple jurisdiction for the administration of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)' does not
work. Despite eleven years of effort, the Department of Labor
(DOL), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)Q 2 do not coordinate their
activities effectively when joint action is needed. These deficien-
cies seriously hamper enforcement and policymaking activities.
If ERISA is to be enforced and pension policy is to be made in a
rational rather than a haphazard manner, ERISA administration
must be consolidated into a single agency.
When citing the deficiencies of ERISA, members of the pen-
sion community most often express concern about the lack of a
policymaking mechanism in pensions.' When issues affecting all
three agencies arise, such as asset reversion, solutions rarely can
be reached in a timely manner. Although the case for a single
agency based on the need for unified policymaking is meritori-
ous, we will focus on enforcement instead; eleven years of evi-
* B.A., 1975, Kirkland College; M.P.A., 1977, Syracuse University; Ph.D., 1982, Johns
Hopkins University.
** B.A., 1964, J.D., 1967, University of Michigan; LL.M., 1969, Georgetown Univer-
sity; member of the District of Columbia and Illinois bars. Mr. Lanoff served as Adminis-
trator, Office of Pension and Welfare Benefits Programs, Labor-Management Services
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, May 1977-December 1981.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18,
26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
2. The PBGC will not be a primary focus of this Article because of its relatively
minor role in general ERISA administration. Title IV of ERISA creates the PBGC as an
independent corporation within the Department of Labor that is charged with adminis-
tering the termination insurance program for defined benefit plans. Nonetheless, the
PBGC depends upon DOL and the IRS to supply it with information about endangered
plans that would adversely affect its financial stability. Although the PBGC has little to
do with fiduciary enforcement, a primary focus of this Article, it is interesting to note the
PBGC's recent involvement in this area in PBGC v. Greene, 570 F. Supp. 1483 (W.D. Pa.
1983), a/f'd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1984).
3. Interviews conducted by Beverly Klimkowsky with members of the pension com-
munity about issues of concern for ERISA's tenth anniversary. Members of the pension
community include past and present governmental officials of DOL, the IRS, the PBGC,
Congress, and the White House as well as plan administrators, trade organization repre-
sentatives, and tax and labor attorneys representing pension plans.
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dence illustrates the failure of shared enforcement responsibili-
ties. A review of fiduciary enforcement, in particular, indicates
that the Department of Labor cannot enforce ERISA; the IRS
does not enforce ERISA; and coordination in this area does not
function well.
Recommending a single agency is not a new idea. Pension re-
form legislation that predated ERISA called for an independent
commission to administer the law. Nearly every year since
ERISA's enactment, a member of Congress has introduced legis-
lation to consolidate its administrative structure.4 Unable to
overcome historical rivalries between committees, however, Con-
gress ignored the tenets of efficient and effective administration
and worked out a multiple-jurisdictional compromise for ERISA
administration. Congress has not moved beyond that compro-
mise in subsequent legislation.
The administrative apparatus that Congress designed in
ERISA called for DOL and the IRS to administer the law
jointly. "Coordination" failed dismally.' Congress deserves
blame more than the agencies because Congress charged others
with an impossible task.
ERISA could not be administered as legislated; a change had
to be made. The agencies, loathe to have the program taken
away from them, agreed to divide the responsibilities between
them in a Memorandum of Understanding. That agreement be-
came the basis of President Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 46
that divided ERISA administration and forms the basis for the
current administration. The agencies and Congress were, how-
ever, unable to reach a compromise about enforcement and fol-
lowed Congress's prior example. In the absence of agreement,
the agencies had no choice but to continue to "coordinate" en-
forcement efforts. Thus, although Reorganization Plan No. 4
severed most of the ties between the agencies, enforcement re-
mained a common link requiring joint efforts.
Because pension plans involve large numbers of participants,
represent a large body of capital, and relieve the social security
system of some pressure, pension policy and administration are
4. Senators Javits and Williams introduced S. 3017 in the 95th Congress and S. 209
in the 96th Congress. During the 97th Congress, Senators Nickles, Wallop, and Hatch,
and Congressmen Erlenborn, Ashbrook, and Frenzel sponsored S. 1541 and H.R. 4330
respectively.
5. "Coordination" is a nonspecific word when used in an administrative sense.
Lawmakers most often employ it to cover up disagreement, calling for accord to be
reached during a later stage in the policy process.
6. Reorg. Plan No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 332 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1163
(1982), and in 92 Stat. 3790 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reorg. Plan No. 4].
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important. The current system provides for inadequate enforce-
ment of current law and no consolidated source of pension pol-
icy. These problems can be solved only by the establishment of a
single agency responsible for adminstration of ERISA and devel-
opment of pension policy. In Part I, this Article reviews the as-
pects of pensions that justify the attention of Congress during
consideration of budgets and the federal deficit. Part II docu-
ments the initial administrative problems created by the con-
gressional compromise that divided administrative responsibility
between the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue
Service. Although Reorganization Plan No. 4 solved some of the
initial problems, the remaining problems are not amenable to
resolution within a system of responsibility divided between sep-
arate agencies. The specific problems associated with enforce-
ment are discussed in Part III, which identifies the total failure
of enforcement as a major threat to the future income security
of participants in private pension systems. The establishment of
a single agency, with the transfer of responsibility and funding
from the Department of Labor and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, is necessary to solve these problems and ensure adequate
enforcement of the provisions of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
An understanding of the politics of pensions provides a useful
background to a closer examination of fiduciary enforcement.
Politics is often described as the art of understanding who gets
what, when, and how. 7 Application of these standards to pen-
sions reveals the stakes involved in pension policy. Decisions af-
fect who participates in pension plans, under what conditions,
when and whether they receive pension benefits, and how em-
ployer contributions are treated for tax purposes.
Private pensions play a critical role in the retirement income
security of millions of Americans and in the nation's economy.
Their importance as a political and economic issue grows over
time. When pensions were first inaugurated, relatively few per-
sons participated in plans and the total assets of the funds
amounted to relatively small pools of capital. In 1983, approxi-
mately 15,000,000 Americans were recipients of benefits from
7. Harold Dwight Lasswell formalized this concept in POLITICS: WHO GETs WHAT,
WHEN, How (1950).
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employer-sponsored pension plans, and approximately
51,500,000 workers were covered by such plans." Pension
reserves are currently valued at nearly one trillion dollars and
are growing rapidly.9 Retirees depend upon their pension bene-
fits to sustain them, and workers regard their pensions as their
security for the future.
Politicians concern themselves with pensions for several rea-
sons. First, because pensions are important to their constituents,
they are important to politicians. Second, private pensions re-
lieve some of the pressure placed on social security, an expensive
public program. Third, and more cynically, pension plan benefi-
ciaries and participants belong to two groups that vote in high
rates-the elderly and the affluent.
Pensions also play a critical role in the nation's economy.
Much of the pension money is invested in stocks in large portfo-
lios. Decisions about how those funds can be invested, as well as
actual investment decisions, affect economic growth.
Large funds also constitute ripe grounds for illegal activities.
As the investigation of the Teamsters Central States Pension
Fund10 shows, plan officials can bilk pension funds of their as-
sets. Pension regulators, therefore, must be vigilant about en-
forcing ERISA.
The involvement of several agencies in the administration of
pension policy occurred incrementally. In response to specific
problems, Congress regulated pensions and pension funds on a
piece-meal basis. Because a series of Revenue Acts created pen-
sions, the IRS has traditionally regulated them.1 Congress, con-
cerned but not alarmed about the operation of pension funds,
passed the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (WPPDA)
8. Telephone interview with Dr. Emily S. Andrews of the Employee Benefit Research
Institute (Nov. 12, 1985) (quoting E. ANDREWS, THE CHANGING PROFILE OF PENSIONS IN
AMERICA (1985)).
9. Department of Labor's Enforcement of the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1985) (testimony
of Francis X. Lilly, Solicitor, Department of Labor).
10. Oversight of Labor Department's Investigation of Teamsters Central States
Pension Fund: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the
Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Investigation of Teamsters Central States Pension Fund].
11. The Revenue Act of 1921 allowed income tax deductions for trusts that accumu-
lated earnings made by employers to profit sharing and stock bonus plans. The Revenue
Act of 1926 enlarged this exemption to include pension plan trusts. The Revenue Act of
1928 allowed pension plan deductions. The Revenue Act of 1942 tightened the tax quali-
fication requirements for pension plans, eliminating tax deductions for plans that benefit
solely the highest paid workers or owners.
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in 1958.12 It charged the Department of Labor with the adminis-
tration of the Act, which required pension and welfare plans to
file information with DOL, but did not set standards for plans or
provide harsh sanctions for noncompliance. Because of the
"toothlessness" of the WPPDA, no one challenged DOL's entry
into the pension policy arena. DOL developed a reputation for
"warehousing paper."
Congress drafted and enacted ERISA in the aftermath of the
highly publicized termination of the Studebaker Pension Fund.'3
Clearly, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act had not
effectively "reformed" the pension system. Politicians and the
media scrambled to jump on the reform bandwagon. Presiden-
tial commissions and congressional committees delved into the
study of private pension plans, unearthing a Sodom and Gomor-
rah of pension abuses."' These abuses ranged from extremely
stringent, albeit legal, requirements for participation and vesting
to fraudulent investing of the money accumulating in pension
funds.
Suddenly, pension regulation no longer suffered from a lack-
luster image. Competition for control of pension fund regulation
arose on many levels: between House and Senate; between tax
committees and labor committees; between the IRS and DOL;
and between fiduciaries, accountants, lawyers, and myriad other
professionals servicing pension plans.
Each of these actors claimed pensions as "their" issue. The
tax factions, such as the House Committee on Ways and Means,
the Senate Finance Committee, and the IRS, laid a historical
claim to pensions and argued against the separability of the is-
sue from the tax code, ensuring their constant influence. These
committees exercise a great deal of power on Capitol Hill.
The labor factions, such as the House and Senate Labor Com-
mittees and the Department of Labor, led the initial charge for
pension reform. 15 They legitimized their claim to pension reform
12. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958).
13. As a result of the termination, workers with vested pension rights, but who were
not close to retirement, forfeited 85% of their benefits. ERISA Advisory Council, Na-
tional Pension Forum 130-31 (Dep't of Labor transcript, Sept. 12, 1984) (testimony of
Frank Cummings).
14. In January 1965, President Kennedy's Committee on Corporate Pension Funds
and Other Private Retirement and Welfare Programs issued its report, PUBLIC POLICY
AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RE-
TIREMENT PLANS. In 1971 and 1972, the Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare held a series of hearings that resulted in PRIVATE WELFARE
AND PENSION PLAN STUDY, 1971 AND 1972, parts 1 and 2.
15. The Senate Labor Committee, under the leadership of Harrison Williams and
Jacob Javits, held hearings and submitted the bills that predated ERISA. The public
FALL 19851
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by casting it as an employee compensation issue: workers were
being denied their rights to compensation that had been earned
but deferred for the future.
House and Senate rivalries erupted late in the policy forma-
tion process when the House Committee on Ways and Means
tried to assert its constitutional right to legislate revenue mat-
ters. Amid this crossfire of claims and divergent perspectives,
the ERISA Conference Committee met to iron out the differ-
ences in three pension reform bills.
The several factions within Congress diverged sharply over the
substance of pension reform and the proposed administration of
the new program.16 As ERISA was written, DOL and the IRS
shared responsibilities jointly, as opposed to having divided re-
sponsibilities, necessitating intensive coordination between the
two agencies if the law was to be implemented. Because political
compromise rather than ease of administration dictated the ad-
ministrative structure of ERISA, severe management problems
surfaced as soon as managers attempted to implement the new
law.
II. INITIAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
ERISA's administrative problems stem from three major
sources: the complexity of the law, the need to coordinate be-
tween agencies, and the lack of autonomy within the IRS and
DOL. Implementing ERISA under any circumstances would
have been a task worthy of the most capable administrator. The
law is exceedingly complex and contained short transition peri-
ods during the initial years.17 The administrative structure, how-
ever, proved to be unworkable."8 It shackled one administrator
to another administrator in a separate agency and required coor-
and the media recognized this leadership role.
16. The tax committees wanted ERISA to be administered by the Internal Revenue
Service; the Labor committees chose the Department of Labor as the preferred imple-
menting agency. Creating a new independent commission or agency would have solved
the stalemate, but neither faction would yield control.
17. Jacob Javits once noted that ERISA was one of the most complex pieces of legis-
lation that had ever gone through Congress. Oversight of ERISA, 1977: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oversight of ERISA, 1977]. ERISA's implementors had
less than a year and a half before many of the provisions became effective.
18. ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982) lists a litany of transactions that ERISA
prohibits. Many of the prohibited transactions were formerly common business practices.
Plans can, however, apply for exemptions from these prohibitions. Processing these ex-
emptions has been an administrative nightmare, fraught with delay.
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dinated efforts for the issuance of new regulations and the au-
thorization of exemptions. ERISA's initial problems included ex-
cessive paperwork, delays in issuing rules and regulations, delays
in issuing exemptions from the prohibited transactions provi-
sions, and burdensome reporting requirements.19
Time and Reorganization Plan No. 4 have alleviated the
problems of complexity and coordination. Although ERISA re-
mains complex, members of the pension community are familiar
with it now. The agencies simplified the initial paperwork re-
quirements in response to public pressure. The issuance of regu-
lations eliminated the uncertainty that prevailed during
ERISA's first days.
Reorganization Plan No. 4 aimed to eradicate the jurisdic-
tional overlap between the Departments of Labor and Treasury.
But agreement could not be reached with Congress on separa-
tion of all functions. Specifically, Reorganization Plan No. 4 pro-
posed that: (1) authority over minimum standards in participa-
tion, vesting, and funding be held exclusively by Treasury; (2)
authority for fiduciary obligations, including prohibited transac-
tions, be held exclusively by DOL; (3) coordination be continued
on notices of intent to disqualify multiemployer plans; (4) each
agency retain enforcement responsibility; and (5) the program
be reevaluated and long-range recommendations for change be
submitted on or before January 31, 1980.20 The current adminis-
trative structure of ERISA retains the divisions of responsibility
agreed to by the agencies and reflected in Reorganization Plan
No. 4.
In addition to allocating administrative tasks, Reorganization
Plan No. 4 sought to reduce delays in issuing regulations and in
processing applications for exemptions from the prohibited
transactions provisions of ERISA. s1 Administration of these two
aspects of ERISA improved significantly in the first year under
19. Pension Reform Act of 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL, EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, HR. Doc. No. 99, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 OMB TASK FORCE REPORT]; U.S.
COMMISSION ON FEDERAL PAPERWORK, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT
(1976).
20. Reorg. Plan No. 4, supra note 6, at 332-34.
21. According to the agencies, ERISA required that 215 regulations be issued. Four
years after ERISA's passage, half the regulations had not been published. By 1978, 1,148
exemption applications had been received, but only half of the cases had been closed.
The average processing time for applications was 15 months, but some applications had
been pending for several years. See 1980 OMB TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 38.
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Reorganization Plan No. 4.2"
A third problem has not been solved by time or Reorganiza-
tion Plan No. 4. The administrative units responsible for ERISA
suffer from internal bureaucratic pressures and a lack of auton-
omy. The missions of the IRS and DOL are not always consis-
tent with ERISA's goals. When conflicts arise between the goals
of the Departments and the goals of ERISA, the Departments'
goals often receive a higher priority. The Departments of Treas-
ury and Labor buried the offices administering ERISA far down
the hierarchical ladder.23 Couched within larger bureaucracies,
the IRS's Office of Employee Plans/Exempt Organizations and
DOL's Office of Pension Welfare Benefit Programs compete with
other offices for scarce resources and the ear of the Secretary of
the Department; their administrators are far removed from the
President, and all communications to the higher echelons of gov-
ernment must filter through many layers of bureaucracy. Re-
cently, the Office of Employee Plans/Exempt 'Organizations has
been moved further from the sources of power within the Treas-
ury by the imposition of an additional layer of bureaucracy be-
tween the Commissioner of the IRS and the Assistant Commis-
sioner, Employee Plans/Exempt Organizations.
III. ERISA ENFORCEMENT
Enforcement is another area of ERISA that has not improved
over time. Enforcement's appearance at a late stage in the policy
process does not diminish its importance. An undeniable thrust
and purpose of ERISA is to protect plans and their participants
22. Although the OMB Task Force noted significant progress in these aspects of
ERISA in the first year, improvement did not continue at that rapid pace. Ten years
after ERISA's enactment, some regulations have yet to be issued. In addition, delays
once more plague the exemption process. Initially the issuance of many class exemptions
expedited the process. Most of the class exemptions have now been issued and the ma-
jority of the remaining applications require individual determinations.
23. Although the Department of the Treasury retained policymaking responsibility
within its Office of Tax Policy, it delegated its ERISA program responsibilities to the
Internal Revenue Service. ERISA created a new office and a new assistant commissioner
position in the IRS, the Office of Employee Plans/Exempt Organizations (EP/EO). 26
U.S.C. § 7802(b) (1982). The Assistant Commissioner EP/EO, who reports to the Com-
missioner of the IRS and the Deputy Commissioner, manages the provisions of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code governing employee benefit plans and other tax-exempt organizations.
EP/EO, however, lacks status within the IRS; its mission is peripheral to the main reve-
nue raising function of the Service. Recently, DOL established the Pension and Welfare
Benefit Administration which will be directed by an Assistant Secretary. It must still
report, however, to the Secretary and Undersecretary of Labor.
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from fiduciary breaches. The Supreme Court most recently rec-
ognized this in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Russell: "The floor debate also reveals that the crucible of con-
gressional concern was misuse and mismanagement of plan as-
sets by plan administrators and that ERISA was designed to
prevent this abuse in the future. '24 The ERISA Enforcement
Working Group noted that "[e]nforcement does not exist in a
vacuum. . . . Any national enforcement policy must be an inte-
gral part of an overall unified approach which considers all as-
pects of governmental involvement in the regulation of employee
benefit plans. '2 5
A law is good only if it is obeyed; government does not know
whether its citizens obey a law unless government checks to see
that they do or violations are brought to the government's atten-
tion. To prevent crises from occurring and to protect the integ-
rity of laws, the government usually spends money on law
enforcement.
An ideal enforcement program strives to attain the highest
level of voluntary compliance. But given that some persons will
not comply without the fear of negative sanctions, investigations
and audits must be conducted. To be effective, investigators
should focus most of their resources on the bad actors, but also
employ a random audit process to keep everyone honest. The
available resources should be divided between approaches to
monitor the greatest number of plans and to protect the greatest
number of plan participants. An adequate level of funding, how-
ever, is a prerequisite to the mounting of a credible enforcement
effort.
No one really knows how well pension plans adhere to
ERISA's fiduciary provisions. Neither DOL nor the IRS exam-
ines plans on a routine basis. In addition, Congress has never
allocated enough funds to enable plans to be audited at a rate
similar to other financial enforcement programs such as those of
the Securities and Exchange Commission and federal banking
regulatory agencies.
24. 105 S. Ct. 3085, 3087 n.8 (1985) (citations and quotations from congressional de-
bate omitted).
25. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FINAL REPORT OF THE ERISA ENFORCEMENT WORKING
GROUP 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as the ERISA ENFORCEMENT REPORT] (copy on file
with U. MICH. J.L. REF).
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A. Enforcement at Labor
The Labor Department's historical difficulties in administer-
ing ERISA have been well documented.2 These problems ex-
tend into the enforcement area and persist despite knowledge of
their existence. Based on the Department's uneven performance
during the past ten years, one can say that DOL cannot enforce
its responsibilities under ERISA. In a recently conducted study
of enforcement, the Department itself concludes:
[E]ven if the program were organized in the best possible
way and performing with 100 percent efficiency, the re-
sources currently available are totally inadequate. Major
personnel and material enhancements are necessary to al-
low even the most minimal level of credibility to be es-
tablished within the employee benefit plan community.
Only when such credibility is established can ERISA en-
forcement be said to be operating at a fully successful
level.27
DOL's inability to enforce ERISA effectively stems from two
major sources: lack of resources and internal management
problems. Both of these categories encompass many smaller
issues.
DOL's attempts to enforce ERISA have been plagued by in-
sufficient staff, untrained personnel, and by a lack of informa-
tion with which to target enforcement efforts. Enforcing ERISA
vigorously would require a large staff. Currently, DOL oversees
both pension plans-43,200 with more than 100 participants and
732,000 with fewer than 100 participants-and welfare
plans-63,900 with more than 100 participants and an estimated
four million with fewer than 100 participants.28 One hundred
and seventy-five investigators and auditors currently police this
plan universe.29 The budgeted ceiling is 223 enforcement staff
26. In addition to the sources cited supra note 19, see Oversight on ERISA, 1978:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor Standards of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Investigation of Teamsters Central States Pen-
sion Fund, supra note 10; Oversight of ERISA, 1977, supra note 17; ERISA ENFORCE-
MENT REPORT, supra note 25; NATIONAL PENSION FORUM, PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ACTION BY SECRETARY DONOVAN (1984) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL PENSION FO-
RUM] (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REP.).
27. ERISA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 69-70.




positions.30 If DOL were to review each of the larger plans and a
two percent sample of the smaller plans every year, it would re-
quire 2,600 investigators.31
Delays in processing ERISA paperwork and failure to enforce
the program vigorously can be attributed in part to personnel
cutbacks the Reagan administration mandated. Nearly all gov-
ernment agencies have experienced personnel cutbacks since
1980; the agencies administering ERISA are not exceptions.
Given the current political climate, it is unlikely that even mod-
est increases will be made in the size of the investigating staff.
Certainly, increases of the magnitude necessary to enforce the
program vigorously will not be forthcoming.
Enforcing the fiduciary provisions of ERISA requires knowl-
edge of securities, investment banking, and real estate. As the
size of pension funds grows, new types of investments must be
sought. When ERISA was first enacted, many of the investiga-
tors had been transferred from the Labor-Management Services
Administration and were not trained in pensions.32 Although the
quality of the investigators has been upgraded over the years,
the qualifications still fall short of the requirements of the job.
Additionally, DOL's training efforts do not match its need: only
four national office training programs have been held in ten
years.
Lack of information about pension plans to be investigated
poses myriad problems. Because of initial criticisms about the
excessive paperwork ERISA caused, DOL and the IRS agreed to
share the information gathered on the annual report that pen-
sion plans must file, which is Form 5500. The IRS receives that
information, codes it for computer processing, and forwards it to
the DOL. This process hampers fiduciary enforcement in several
ways. First, DOL investigators receive information that is insuf-
ficient for enforcement purposes. The IRS codes only fifteen
items on Form 5500, including identifying information. Discrep-
ancies in plan operations cannot be detected with this small
amount of information. Second, delays in receiving information
mean that DOL investigators often do not have information
from the most recent forms filed by pension plans. Assuming
that the IRS receives complete information in a timely manner,
the information is at least a year old when DOL gets it.33 Thus,
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Many of those investigators came to the Labor-Management Services Administra-
tion after careers at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
33. Plans need not file their annual reports until seven months after the end of the
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investigators often must ask plans to supply the most recent
copies of their annual reports, severely hampering DOL's credi-
bility as a capable enforcer.
The second major source of DOL's enforcement difficulties is
internal management problems. Internal bureaucratic infighting
causes many administrative difficulties, including problems in fi-
duciary enforcement. Frequent changes in the top ERISA posi-
tion and ongoing rivalries between different factions of DOL
have resulted in an inconsistent philosophy of enforcement, in a
lack of independence of the enforcement branch, and in a per-
ception that no climate for enforcement exists within the
Department.
No ERISA enforcement program in DOL has outlasted the
Administrator who initiated it. Considering that five persons
have occupied the key position in ten years, enforcement has
been subject to frequent changes and reversals. During the first
years of implementation, DOL's philosophy of enforcement
closely mirrored that of the IRS: attempting to secure voluntary
compliance. At the beginning of a program, especially one as
complex as ERISA, resources can best be spent informing the
public about their obligations under the new law. At this stage,
many plans probably were in violation of the law unknowingly.
Focusing efforts on clarifying the new law and disseminating in-
formation to the public permits the program to move to a ma-
ture stage of operations more quickly.
Criticism of the enforcement program's emphasis on technical
assistance and public education led to the inauguration in 1978
of the "significant case" approach. Acknowledging the scarcity of
enforcement resources, this approach sought to secure the widest
enforcement and greatest compliance by focusing on fiduciary
investigations of large plans. It took several years before the sys-
tem worked well; field investigators had to be taught what con-
stituted a significant case and the Solicitor's office and the field
offices had to develop a working relationship. The significant
case approach purposely excluded many areas of ERISA en-
forcement, including delinquent and deficient annual report fil-
ings, criminal investigations, and all enforcement related to
small plans. The Government Accounting Office, the Walsh re-
port, and the Senate Labor Subcommittee criticized the Depart-
ment's enforcement program for its deficiencies.3 4
plan year. The IRS takes several months to keypunch data, and then a few months are
needed to microfiche the data. ERISA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 42-43.
34. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, LAWS PROTECTING UNION MEMBERS AND THEIR PEN-
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In response to these criticisms, DOL redirected its enforce-
ment efforts in 1982 just as the significant case approach was
beginning to prove highly successful. It dropped the significant
case approach to emphasize criminal enforcement, greater re-
view of small plans, and consideration of nonfiduciary violations.
Criticisms of this newest enforcement effort focus on its vague-
ness, inconsistency, and absence of a defined strategy. 35 Given
the appointment of another individual to direct the program, en-
forcement policy has not yet been redirected in response to the
latest comments.
The enforcement division of the Office of Pension Welfare
Benefit Programs has suffered from the lack of independence
that the Office itself has endured. In essence, DOL grafted
ERISA enforcement onto the preexisting structure of the Labor
Management-Services Administration. As a result, enforcement
became decentralized. ERISA investigators have not been given
a great deal of autonomy. Perhaps because of the continuing
scrutiny of their actions by others involved in pension policy,
DOL has kept a close eye on their progress. In response, investi-
gators have been very conservative instead of engaging in pru-
dent risk-taking that might enhance their enforcement efforts.
The ERISA Enforcement Working Group noted that a climate
for enforcement did not exist within DOL. Although they could
not single out an overriding factor, they noted a lack of zeal
within the Department of Labor for enforcement, the delegation
of criminal investigations to the Department of Justice, and the
lack of consideration for the impact administrative decisions
would have on program enforcement. 36 The lack of continuity in
enforcement policies and the high degree of outside criticism
create an unstable enforcement environment. Steps taken over
the past several months do raise hope regarding improved man-
agement. The new chief of enforcement was recruited from the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Also, a new Division of
Investigations has been established in the national office to ad-
minister a program of nationwide investigations. However, this
initiative will not be productive unless it is provided additional
SION AND WELFARE BENEFITS SHOULD BE BETTER ENFORCED, H.R. Doc. No. 154, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); J. WALSH, REPORT EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS, ERISA
ENFORCEMENT (1982); Retirement Income Incentives and Administrative Simplification
Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982).
35. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LMSA REORGANIZATION
(1984); General Accounting Office Unofficial Comments of Feb. 24, 1984.
36. See ERISA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 66-69.
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personnel and adequate resources.
The record shows that the Department of Labor has been un-
able to enforce ERISA. Its resources never have been sufficient
to mount a credible enforcement effort. Shifts in management
priorities have weakened enforcement still further. Despite re-
cent reorganizations that should give the ERISA program more
autonomy, there is little reason to hope that ERISA enforce-
ment will improve dramatically in the immediate future.
B. Enforcement at the IRS
Under Reorganization Plan No. 4, the IRS has responsibility
for enforcing the minimum vesting, participation, and funding
standards of ERISA. Also, it is responsible for aiding DOL in
enforcing ERISA's fiduciary standards.
Although the IRS has the means to enforce ERISA vigorously,
it has not chosen to do so. The IRS considers its main function
to be revenue raising. ERISA enforcement, peripheral to the
agency's mission, receives a low priority. The most recent state-
ment of the IRS's mission reads:
The purpose of the IRS is to collect the proper amount of
tax revenues at the least cost to the public, and in a man-
ner that warrants the highest degree of public confidence
in our integrity, efficiency, and fairness. To achieve that
purpose, we will: encourage and achieve the highest pos-
sible degree of voluntary compliance .... 11
Under the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS determines
whether pension plans are qualified for tax exempt status. Typi-
cally, pension plans apply for a letter of determination, in which
the IRS certifies that their plan is in compliance with the law.
This process is voluntary, however, because pension plans need
not obtain a determination letter in order to be tax exempt.
Congress has not scrutinized the IRS's enforcement of ERISA
to the extent that it has examined DOL's enforcement. The last
report on IRS enforcement was issued by the Government Ac-
counting Office (GAO) in 1979. The report concluded, "During
the 4 years since the enactment of ERISA, IRS has spent most
of its field enforcement effort on determining whether plan pro-
37. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF COUNSEL, 1984 IRS ANN.
REP. [hereinafter cited as 1984 IRS ANN. REP.].
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visions comply with ERISA requirements. Little effort has been
spent on determining whether plans operate in accordance with
ERISA requirements." 3s
Although voluntary compliance by pension plans is preferable,
plans must be examined to see if they are in compliance. At the
time of the 1979 GAO report, the IRS recognized the need to
improve its enforcement program and reported plans to increase
the number of examinations, develop criteria both to measure
the extent of compliance with ERISA and select plans for exam-
ination, and upgrade efforts to assure the quality of determina-
tion letters.39 The GAO has not reexamined the IRS's enforce-
ment efforts to determine whether these goals have been met.
To date, the IRS has not developed a compliance monitoring
system to select plans for audit. Although it conducted 27,732
examinations of employee plans in 1984 compared to 12,461 in
1978, this constitutes less than three percent of all plans, a mea-
ger sampling at best.4 0
The IRS has been dilatory in other aspects of its ERISA en-
forcement program. It has responsibility for processing Form
5500, but no records exist of the IRS assessing any penalty for a
pension plan's failure to file an annual report or a plan's filing of
an annual report with deficient information.4 1 As another exam-
ple of the IRS's lack of vigor in ERISA enforcement, the IRS
abandoned a program that compared tax deductions taken for
contributions to employee benefit plans with filings of Forms
5500.42 How can the IRS determine whether a Form 5500 has
been filed unless it crosschecks with other records?
The IRS places a low priority on enforcing the ERISA respon-
sibilities that Reorganization Plan No. 4 delegated to it. It
places an even lower priority on cooperating with other agencies
to. coordinate enforcement activities. Unfortunately, oversight
committees, the GAO, and the pension community rarely scruti-
nize the IRS's lapses in ERISA enforcement.
38. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE EFFORTS AND PLANS TO
ENFORCE THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 55, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 GAO REP.].
39. Id.
40. Comparison of number of examined plans cited in 1984 IRS ANN. REP., supra
note 37, at 20 with those cited in 1979 GAO REP., supra note 38, at 5.
41. ERISA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 45-46.
42. Id. at 46.
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C. Coordinated Enforcement
Coordinated enforcement fails even more dismally than intra-
agency enforcement. Despite Reorganization Plan No. 4, the
agencies charged with enforcing ERISA have failed to coordinate
their activities internally and externally and to mount an effec-
tive enforcement program. Differing views about enforcement
and scattered responsibilities account for failures in coordina-
tion of enforcement activities. Joint enforcement efforts have
chronically fallen far short of goals.
The responsibility for enforcement of employee benefit pro-
grams is diffused within the Departments and within the federal
government. The Department of Labor reports that "in every
area, from policy decisions to the conduct of specific investiga-
tions, the enforcement effort is not as effective as it should be
and has suffered from a lack of coordination among the various
responsible agencies."' s
In general, coordination does not work well because the agen-
cies have different perspectives on what constitutes a violation
and different priorities for the several aspects of enforcement.
Agencies do not seem to follow up on leads received from other
agencies, nor do they actively check on the status of matters re-
ferred to other agencies.
Coordination has not worked in the enforcement of the provi-
sions for prohibiting certain transactions, the application of
checksheets to monitor compliance," and the creation of an en-
forcement data base. In the area of prohibited transactions,
DOL and the IRS agreed in 1983 that DOL would transmit in-
formation to the IRS about plans that DOL believed were vio-
lating the prohibited transactions provisions of ERISA and were
thereby candidates for the imposition of an excise tax. Of the
390 cases that DOL referred between June 1983 and May 1984,
123 have been closed. Of those, the IRS closed 107 cases with no
action and imposed an excise tax in 16 cases. The Department of
Labor concludes, "Based on these results, DOL's agreement with
the IRS does not appear to be working as planned."' 5
Coordination also does not appear to be working in the circu-
43. Id. at ii.
44. In response to plans' complaints about multiple audits of their activities by dif-
ferent agencies, the IRS and DOL instituted the checksheet program. The agencies
agreed to circulate checksheets among themselves to avoid duplicative audits, to better
utilize resources, and to pass on information of interest to another agency.
45. ERISA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 25, at 31.
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lation of checksheets. Representatives from DOL and the PBGC
have expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of cooperation they
feel they get from the IRS46 and claim that the IRS does not fill
out the checksheets.
In a third area, the establishment of a data base for ERISA
enforcement, coordination also has not worked. 7 The IRS codes
Form 5500 data to meet its own needs but fails to provide ade-
quate enforcement information to DOL from Form 5500. Reso-
lution of this problem appears improbable because funds for
data entry and analysis come from the budgets of separate
agencies.
Based on this evidence, one can conclude that the Labor De-
partment cannot enforce ERISA, the IRS does not choose to en-
force ERISA, and the coordinated enforcement mandated by
Reorganization Plan No. 4 does not work.
D. Single Agency Enforcement
If ERISA is to be enforced, a single agency holds the most
promise for success. History has proven that interagency coordi-
nation does not work. A single agency would eliminate the need
for coordination between agencies. It would also reduce internal
management problems; the goals of pension policy and enforce-
ment would no longer have to compete with other goals of agen-
cies or departments.
Reorganization Plan No. 4 palliated the initial sting of con-
flicting agency actions regarding ERISA. It untangled a web of
administrative problems that had prevented the Department of
Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation from administering ERISA as the law
was written. The divisions of responsibilities between the IRS
and DOL enabled administrators to focus their energies on spe-
cific aspects of ERISA without the burden of coordinating their
actions with another agency. Reorganization Plan No. 4 suc-
ceeded in making ERISA administrable. It did not, however,
eliminate the need to coordinate entirely, nor did it correct sev-
eral administrative deficiencies that seriously limited Congress's
ability to establish and evaluate pension policy.
46. Interview with Henry Rose, Former Legal Counsel for PBGC (Dec. 1984).
47. In fairness to the agencies, one must note that they labor under difficult condi-
tions due to the lack of funding they receive to mount such an effort. Starting up a data
base information system is very costly.
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The 1980 OMB Task Force Report, the last official review of
the dual jurisdictional administrative structure, noted the fol-
lowing deficiencies: (1) lack of a policymaking mechanism in the
executive branch; (2) lack of a coordinating mechanism to assess
the overall impact of ERISA and its regulations; (3) lack of a
mechanism to coordinate the interpretation and enforcement of
ERISA; (4) lack of an oversight and evaluation mechanism of
ERISA on a continuing basis; and (5) lack of a comprehensive
data base information system."8
The lack of a mechanism to coordinate enforcement and the
absence of a data base information system make ERISA enforce-
ment virtually nonexistent. Given the scarcity of resources allo-
cated to enforcement, those resources must be focused on plans
most likely to be out of compliance. Without an effective data
base information system, investigators must rely on less sure
means to determine which plans might not be in compliance.
Despite several attempts, the agencies have failed to develop a
data base information system, rendering enforcement targeting
impotent. The National Pension Forum confirms this evaluation
when it states: "Electronic information management is the only
way to create an ERISA data base which will support effective
enforcement of ERISA's substantive requirements, responsible
discharge of the Department's research and policy obligations,
and for public information purposes. The present situation is
unacceptable. '49
The National Pension Forum recommended that the Secre-
tary of Labor request approval for the computerization of an
ERISA management information system and that an Office of
Pension Statistics be established.50 The successful accomplish-
ment of this goal would be an improvement of the status quo,
but several obstacles stand in the way. The most formidable bar-
rier is the IRS, which clings tenaciously to its claim to be the
repository of pension data. The other obvious problem would be
getting Congress to fund such an office, especially because some
duplication would occur at the IRS.
A single agency could solve the problems of enforcement and
establishment of a data base information system. Clearly, it
would be easier to coordinate enforcement and sharing of a data
base in one agency. Physically, information would not have to be
transported between offices, reducing the delays in getting infor-
48. 1980 OMB TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 75-76.
49. NATIONAL PENSION FORUM, supra note 26, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
50. Id. at 5, 11.
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mation to appropriate offices that currently plague enforcement
efforts. Further, one unit would be responsible for each activity.
The 1980 OMB Task Force concluded "Despite 1979 improve-
ments, the existing institutional arrangements for ERISA ad-
ministration are not adequate to most efficiently, and practi-
cally, administer the [A]ct for the longer-term future . . .(but)
proposals to establish a new single-mission agency for ERISA
administration are premature." 5' Five years have passed since
that assessment. Satisfaction with Reorganization Plan No. 4 no
longer overwhelms the desire of many members of the pension
community to leave ERISA administration alone because it
works.
Time accentuates, rather than diminishes, the deficiencies in
the administration of ERISA. The lack of a policymaking mech-
anism in pensions frustrates pension administrators each time
they deal with issues such as asset reversions. Future policymak-
ers and the public may wonder why more was not done to coor-
dinate policies in private pensions, public pensions, and social
security.
The lack of coordination in ERISA enforcement and the pau-
city of resources invested in this area of the program undermine
the security of pensions. The potential for pension fraud grows
as the number of funds and their total assets grow, as the types
of investments made by funds diversify, and as the chances of a
plan being audited remain low due to inadequate enforcement.
Establishing a single agency for ERISA administration would
provide a policymaking mechanism in the executive branch and
a unified enforcement effort. A single agency could also provide
impact statements and internal evaluations. A single agency
would provide a location for a comprehensive repository of pen-
sion data if policymakers were to fund such an effort.
CONCLUSION
Because policymakers in Washington currently focus on
budget deficits, trade deficits, and changes in tax policy, politi-
cians ignore the importance of pension policy. One trillion dol-
lars of pension reserves constitute an enormous fund for eco-
nomic recovery.52 An estimated $39 billion expenditure in 1985
for private pension funds comprises a large category of tax ex-
51. 1980 OMB TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 75-76.
52. See supra text accompanying note 9.
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penditure.5 3 Despite the obvious links between the budget deficit
and tax policy and pension policy, most members of Congress
decide that they cannot fathom the complexities of pensions.
They choose to ignore the issue, blithely assuming that ERISA
corrected what was wrong with pensions. A leadership vacuum
has existed since the retirement of ERISA's framers.
Unfortunately, the lack of ERISA enforcement jeopardizes the
retirement income security of millions of Americans. Unless
measures are taken to ensure that the law is being obeyed, only
time will reveal the depth of pension fraud and mismanagement.
The current administrative apparatus of ERISA needs to be
changed. The framers of ERISA recognized its inadequacies
when they sacrificed good management for passage of the law.
Now that ERISA is widely accepted, its shortcomings can be
corrected.
The division of ERISA administration into multiple jurisdic-
tions has created many of ERISA's 'problems. Maintaining an
awkward administrative system for the sake of administrative
continuity has little to recommend it. Conversely, consolidating
administration in a single agency has many advantages. Poli-
cymaking, enforcement, and establishment of a data base infor-
mation system would be enhanced. Nothing holds out the prom-
ise of solving these deficiencies in ERISA like a single agency.
The failure of the Studebaker pension plan showed how inad-
equate the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act was. Un-
less Congress takes measures to ensure the enforcement of
ERISA, a cruel lesson will be taught: a law is only good if it is
enforced. Vigorous enforcement, not paper promises, brings pen-
sion security.
53. Telephone interview with member of Joint Committee on Taxation (Nov. 1,
1985).
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